Giorgia Meloni has achieved something unusual in Italian politics: durability. Her government has become the longest-serving in the country’s republican history, while her party has retained substantial electoral support. Yet longevity does not eliminate political vulnerability, particularly when the greatest threat may come from within the broader ideological camp that brought a government to power.
In a recent analysis for The Guardian, Riccardo Alcaro argues that Roberto Vannacci’s new far-right movement could undermine Meloni’s prospects in the 2027 election. The former general, elected to the European Parliament with the League before establishing National Future, is seeking support among voters who regard the governing coalition as insufficiently radical.
It is a plausible political risk. But it is not yet an inevitable electoral outcome.
A problem of arithmetic and identity
Italy’s coalition politics rewards alliances, and even relatively small movements can become influential when the competition is close. Vannacci does not necessarily need to surpass Meloni to damage her prospects. Attracting voters away from the League or discouraging cooperation within the right could be enough to alter the electoral balance.
Yet opinion polls are not election results. Voters may return to established parties, and the consequences of fragmentation depend on electoral rules, candidate selection and the agreements parties ultimately reach.
The challenge is therefore more complicated than a contest between two personalities. Meloni must decide how far she can accommodate a political competitor without changing the character of her own coalition.
The European dividing line
Alcaro identifies foreign policy as one of the clearest differences. Meloni has made support for Ukraine and cooperation with European and Atlantic partners central to her international position. Vannacci has advocated reopening relations with Russia and opposes further European defence integration.
These are not merely rhetorical distinctions. They concern Italy’s reliability within its alliances and the strategic direction of European security.
Differences over migration, social policy and national identity also matter. But the assumption that every voter attracted to Vannacci shares his entire programme would be simplistic. Protest votes, dissatisfaction with established parties and ideological commitment are not necessarily the same thing.
That distinction matters when assessing how a governing party should respond.
The danger of chasing every voter
A coalition may attempt to neutralise a challenger by adopting some of its language or policies. The strategy can appear attractive in the short term, particularly when opinion polls suggest that a rival is drawing support from its existing electorate.
But accommodation carries costs. It can unsettle moderate coalition partners, create tensions over foreign policy and leave the challenger free to demand still more.
The alternative — drawing a clear political boundary — also involves risk. Some voters may prefer the more radical option, while others may interpret the distinction as tactical rather than principled.
Meloni’s decision will depend partly on the size and durability of Vannacci’s support, neither of which can yet be treated as settled.
THE ITALIC View
The most revealing question is not whether Roberto Vannacci can defeat Giorgia Meloni (far from being the case), but how much influence a smaller political movement can acquire without winning power itself. Coalition arithmetic may reward radical challengers even when their electoral appeal remains limited. Meloni’s real test will be whether she can preserve a workable governing majority without allowing the demands of its most uncompromising potential partners to determine Italy’s political direction. That is a question of leadership, but also of institutional stability.